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BOOK REVIEWS
THE LAW OF TORTS, by Fowler V. Harper and Fleming James, Jr.
(3 volumes). Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1956. Pp. xliv,
2,060. $60.00.
The crying need for adequate textual treatment of the sub-
ject of torts has gradually been fulfilled over the past twenty-
five years. The latest contribution is the three-volume work of
Professors Harper and James of the Yale University Law School.
A set of books as important as this one will doubtless be reviewed
competently, critically, and at length in numerous periodicals
throughout America. For this reason I believe that I should con-
fine my remarks to an attempt to answer a question that will
arise in the minds of many Louisiana lawyers who handle a sub-
stantial amount of torts litigation: Should I add this somewhat
expensive set of books to my office library? The answer, I feel,
is definitely, Yes. I would like to explain why I enthusiastically
recommend this purchase to you.
Most Louisiana torts lawyers already own a copy of Prosser's
excellent textbook. Here they can either find an adequate state-
ment of the fundamental rules and principles of torts law that
they need, or they are referred to some other source where the
need is supplied. But a textbook with the limited proportions of
Prosser on Torts does not afford the necessary elbow room for a
leisurely discussion of the factors that underlie rules and doc-
trines or of the social, moral, and economic impulses that make
the law of torts into a ticking machine. The restrictions imposed
upon Prosser are those of available space. There is no such limi-
tation on the authors of the new work, and most of the time they
have made fine capital of this asset.
The reader will sense immediately a difference in the ap-
proach of Harper and James from that adopted by Dean Prosser.
In reading the treatment of negligence and accidents in the sec-
ond volume he will constantly be made aware that he is dealing
with only a single moment in the constant and inevitable flow
of an ever-changing stream of legal liability. The authors' state-
ments as to what are the legal rules and doctrines of accident
law correspond approximately to those of Prosser and the Re-
statement of Torts. But their estimates as to why the law of
torts is as it is, what it was formerly, and what it is coming to
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be make up the interesting part of the book. These are its real
contributions.
The key to the Harper-James approach will be found in
Chapters 12 and 13. They list as four the possible objectives
which a rational system of accident liability must necessarily
serve: (1) the moral objective; (2) compensation of accident
victims; (3) prevention of accidents and promotion of safety;
(4) avoidance of undue collateral disadvantages, such as the
overburdening of a desirable activity. These objectives are fre-
quently inconsistent with each other and are discovered in vary-
ing degrees of competition in litigation. For this reason the
courts are faced with the constant task of reconsidering ideals.
Furthermore, the proper point at which a balance is to be
achieved is shifting almost from day to day. Significantly Harper
and James point out that in accident law the standard of conduct
is largely external and does not take into account the personal
equation, with the result that legal fault does not entirely co-
incide with moral fault. (p. 753) The second urge - to com-
pensate accident victims - is, of course, one that may conflict
with the desire to relieve morally blameless persons of legal re-
sponsibility for harms inflicted without fault. The point of bal-
ance to be established between these two conflicting urges will
be affected by considering the deterrent effect upon future dan-
gerous conduct that will be achieved by imposing liability in any
given instance. It will also be affected by the giving of weight
to the effect of liability in overburdening desirable enterprising
activity.
It is with reference to this latter consideration - the avoid-
ance of undue hardships upon useful conduct - that the increas-
ing prevalence of risk-distributing machinery (particularly, lia-
bility insurance) is coming to play a dominant role in the formu-
lation of modern torts law. Most of the unevenness and incon-
sistencies that are becoming characteristic of accident rules are
thus to be accounted for.
It is upon the fabric of conflict between these motivating
factors, the shifting panorama of social values and the devising
of new and efficient risk-distribution machinery that the authors
bring into sharp focus a version of a constantly changing and
improving scheme for administering accident controversies. In-
terest is centered, not so much upon what the law is, as upon
what it is coming to be.
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It seems to me that the practical lawyer is no longer inter-
ested merely in concrete rules for concrete cases. Most attorneys
have learned from bitter practical experience that yesterday's
cases and yesterday's rules are being transformed at a dizzy
pace as they are applied in today's controversies. Courts are well
versed in the art of distinguishing cases, of shifting the points
of emphasis in established rules, of gradually transforming the
law through ingenious administration and the skillful manipula-
tion of language. What is behind this? Where are we going?
The modern lawyer cannot possibly avoid speculating as to what
the old rule will sound like when it is applied to the new case.
He must be prepared to press to his client's advantage every
trend that he senses may be developing in the complex picture
of torts administration. It is for this kind of endeavor that the
new treatment of accident law will prove its full value.
Volume 2 on accident law gives full evidence that it is made
up largely of a series of law review articles which Professor
James has published over a period of more than five years. The
microscopic examination of his treatment is typical of good legal
periodical literature. Yet there is no absence of continuity. It is
evident that from the beginning the author had eventual book
publication in mind.
Volume 1 is less exciting, less critical, less speculative. This is
due in large part to the nature of intentional torts. Assaults,
batteries, imprisonments, trespasses - all these are borrowed
largely from the criminal law. The rules have frozen; the com-
peting values have crystallized. Perhaps some creative genius
could impart a spark of life to the subject, but Harper and James
are hardly to be criticized because they have failed to do so. This
is bascially dreary stuff. However, it is not so easy to understand
why the authors failed to stimulate a more lively interest in such
torts as defamation, privacy, infliction of emotional disturbance,
unfair competition, and interference with domestic relations.
Here are subtle, complex, and fast-changing areas of torts law.
About all that I can say of Volume 1 is that it seems to be fairly
comprehensive, that it rests upon the footing of the original
Restatement of Torts, and that it is a basically sound but con-
servative treatment of the subject. I miss in this volume the
eager critical prodding found elsewhere in the treatise.
This set of books is expensive. Many readers will resent
being charged $20.00 for an index and a table of cases - which
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is what Volume 3 amounts to. Many others will wish that they
could buy Volume 2 alone. But such is life, and such are the ways
of bookmakers. If I had to decide whether to part with my $60.00
or to do without Harper and James' treatment of accident lia-
bility, I am sure that I would pass my money over to the pub-
lishers.
Wex S. Malone*
THE RIGHT TO LIFE, by A. Delafield Smith. University of North
Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1955. Pp. ix, 204. $3.50.
Some sixty years ago a leading American sociologist could
justly remark that "In each commonwealth the fabric of the pub-
lic charitable institutions rests upon the quicksands of the poor
law, which few study and probably none understands."' Today,
while the fabric of American welfare programs is infinitely more
complex, the legal framework for these programs is still too little
studied and too little understood. This book, subtitled "A Legal
Approach to Society's Responsibility to the Individual," is there-
fore especially welcome. 2 Written by an Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral in the Federal Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare, it seeks to establish a proper philosophical perspective for
man's undertakings to relieve the dependency needs of his fellow
man.
While the book purports to be an analysis of the "Right to
Life," this reviewer experienced some difficulty in determining
just what is to be included within this term. At one point, Smith
characterizes it as comprehending public protection against the
adverse effects of wage loss, together with public provision of
a full opportunity for personal fulfillment and development.
3
However, and although a few chapters are also devoted to the
legal problems of guardianships, the book seems concerned pri-
marily with the legal and philosophical basis of the American
social security programs.
Both the substantive and administrative aspects of social
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. WARNER, AMERICAN CHARITIES: A STUDY IN PHILANTHROPY AND ECO-
NOMICS 311 (1894), quoted in BRECKENRIDGE, PUBLIC WELFARE ADMINISTRATION
IN THE UNITED STATES 13 (1927).
2. The attention the book has received in the law journals is also welcome.
See, e.g., Manning, Book Review, 66 YALE L.J. 315 (1956). There have been at
least two book reviews in social welfare journals. Virtue, Book Review, 38 SOCIAL
CASEWORK 36 (1957) ; Wright, Book Review, 30 SOCIAL SERv. REV. 373 (1956).
3. Pp. 98, 99.
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